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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

J. HATCH and
HOBERT )L :McRAE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
COeNTY, a party corporate
Hll<l politic, State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

11594

STArrEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
rl'his is an action to recover attorneys' fees and costs
lllldPr tlw provisions of Title 77, Chapter 64, rcA, 1953,
as amended, for se1Tices claimed rendered by the respon<lPnts under appointmt>nt to represent an indigent
<lt>l'<•n<lant in a criminal proceeding before the above-enti tied court.

2

The case was tried lH'fol'P th(• ('<litrt. !'ron1 a judg.
ment for the plaintiffs, the r<'spo;,d<·nb lH·1·p:11, th<' d1·.
fondant, the appellant herPin, appeal::-;.

Respondents st>ek a <l(•eision from this (•ourt affi l'llling the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMEN'L1 OF' FAC'L1S

Respondents agree in general with thr

of

Facts of tlw appellant, Pxcept that portion which
"No other procednr<'s or ste1)s were taken h>- the

l'PSIHlll-

dents to follow 'propl·r procPdnres', ... than the filillg
of this complaint ... "
On November 18, rnG7, respondents mailed a letter
to the Board of County Ccm1111issio1wrs, dd't,ndant's Exhibit 1, enclosing a copy of tlw motion fih-'<l in th<-> Di:;trict Court of vVebt>r Count>-, ddendant's Exhibit 2. 111
said letter, respondt>nts in·eseute><l their claim as
"Pursuant to statute.. , you an' entitled to
notice of my claim, which claim is hert>with madt·
against Weht>r County for thP sum of $1,000.00
fair and reasonabh• compensation for sPrvic<'s l'l'lldered in ... the prt>paration of brief and argument
of this case before the Snpn'me Court.
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In the event I do not receive an acceptance
or rejection of this claim prior to the date of hearing ... I deem your failure to do so as a denial of
::mid claim... "
Said letter and enclosed motion were duly received
h.r tlw Board of County Commissioners, Weber County,
\\ itl1 a carbon copy to the \Veber County Attorney. (AnH·mkd answer to interrogatory No. 1, R. 6; T. 11and12.)
R(•spondents filed the complaint in this action on
Xon"rnher 27, 1968, prior, rather than after, the denial of
thPir appeal in case No. 11187. In paragraph 4 of said
('Orn plaint, it is specifically pointed out that the complaint
\ms filed prior to the possible expiration of the period
of limitations contained in 17-15-12 UCA, as amended.
(R.l)
ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF RES JUDICATA IS
WITHOUT MERIT.

While appellant quotes from Am.Jur. on this subj<·d, the following additional statements from 30A Am.
.Tur. J udg111ents clearly show that the instant case is not
lmrn•d h.'' this doetrinP. 30.A Am. Jnr. section 347, p. 388,
reads as follows:
''Generally.-In stating the doctrine of res
j udica ta, the courts usnally refer to the fact that
the jndg11wnt sought to be used as a basis of the
doctrine was rendered upon the merits, since it
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is a general rule that a judginent i·e1tder('d on an1
grounds which do not involve the 11wr· ts of tl1;,
action may not be used as a lmsis for tl1l' 01wration of the doctrine of res judicata. Under this
rule, an adjudication on grounds purely technical,
where the merits eannot come into qn<'stion, i:'
limited to the point actually decid(•d, and does nut
preclude the maintenanee of a snbtsvquent action
brought in a way to avoid the obj'-ction which
proved fatal in the first action ... "
And, in section 348, p. 390 :
"What Is a Judg1nent on Merits,
A judgment on the merits is said to be one vvhicli
is based on legal rights as distinguished from
mere matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction,
or f orm, ... "
And, in section 349, p. 391:
"Judgment Because of Misconception of
Remedy.-The doctrine of res judicata is not
available as a bar to a subsequent action if the
judgment in the former action was rendered because of a misconception of the remedy availahle
or of the proper form of proceeding. In such situation, the plaintiff is entitled to bring the proper
proceeding to enforce, his cause of action. . . "
And, in section 353, p. 394:
"Judgment Based on Want of .Jurisdiction.A former adjudication is regarded as not being on
the merits where it was based upon the fact that
the court lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the
general rule is that a judgment for the defendant
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hasPcl on ]a('k of ,jnrisdietion does not bar the
plaintiff from bringing an action on the same
cause in a court having jurisdiction... "
1-l<•rP, on (·xamination of
court's decision in case
Ko. 11187,
court only decided that the provisions of
CliaptN' G4, TitlP 77 are mandatory, not permissive, that
a county
res1rnM.:ible for fees 'IVhPre the appointment
was made by this court, and that the proper procedure
had not h<::>l'l1 followed in casP No. 11187; and it is only as
to th\·se matters that tht• said decision is res judicata.
F'nrthl'r, as statt>d in 30A Am.Jur., section 325, p.
371:

''General Application and Limitations.-The
doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal
jurisprudence, forming a part of the legal systems
of all civilized nations. rrhe doctrine is to be applied in particular situations as justice and sound
application of the poiicy behind the doctrine require; it is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or so as to work an injustice ... "
Certainly, 'IYlit>re, as in the instant case, there was no
dl'ar-eut guidt> as to the 1n·ocednre to be followed until this
\'UlLrt,

in vVashington County vs. Day, clarified and set

forth thP proper iirocednr·p, it would clearly be a mis<·arriagti of justice to use the doctrine of res judicata

1n·ecludP a hearing of rt>spondents' case on its merits.

to
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POINT II. THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTAN'IIAL COMPLIANCJ::
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 17-15-10 UCA 1953, AS AMEND
ED, BY THE RESPONDENTS.

Since, as mentioned pre\·ionsly, the proper procednn
to be followed in collecting attorneys fees 1'.nder an appointment by this court was not clear,
in
order to preserve their rights if this court (
as it
did in case No. 11187, that the proper proC'edure was to
have filed a claim under 17-15-10
1953, as amendt•d,
presented their claim to the Board of County Commissioners, Weber County, by letter dated November lS,
1967. Said letter enclosed a copy of the motion then pending before the Weber County District Court and requested that the Weber County Board of Commissioners either
accept or reject the claim and that an appearance by tlw
county in opposition to the motion would be considered
a denial of plaintiffs' claim.
The proper rule, when construing a statute of
nature, is found in 50 Am.J ur. Statutes, section 392, p.
392:
"Remedial Statutes.-It is a general rule of
law that statutes which are remedial in nature are
entitled to a liberal construction, in favor of the
remedy provided by law, or in favor of thm;e entitled to the benefits of the statute. rrhis is true
of a curative statute having a remedial purpose,
or statutes seeking the correction of recognize<l
errors and abuses, remedying defects in <:>arliN
acts, or implying an intention to reform or extend
existing rights."
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\Vhen--, as ]wn•, the Board of County Commissioners
and the
Attorn<.'y rPceived resrJondents' letter
dailll and ap1wan·d to resist the motion and on the appeal, tlwy should not be vennitted to attempt to deny
11oticP of such claim,
on the grounds that respondents should haYt> presc·nted the claim to the Weber
County Auditor. This is particularly true in view of the
language of 17-15-10, when•in it says: " . . . nor shall
tlw board credit or alloil'
claim ... until it has been
passed upon
thP county auditor ... Every claim against thl' county must be presented to the county auditor
... " ( Pmphasis supplied), which could be interpreted
to n•qnirt> the ]H'esentation of the claim to the auditor
hy the Board of County Commissioners, rather than by
tlw respondent, and
only if they are allowing the
dairn. Further, the last sentence of 17-15-10, which it
lw noted "·as omitt2d from the quote of this statute
the ap1wllant, reads as follows: "If the board shall refrnw to hPar or consider a claim because it is not properly
madt' ont, it shall can::->e notice of the fact to be given to
tltP claimant or to his agent. .. " This sentence is obviously intended to preclude
the County is attempting
to do hPre, i.P. to evade its responsibility for the payment
of a valid claim on technical grounds, and casts upon the
lJoard an affinnative duty to give a claimant notice of
Jpfrets in his claim and tinw to correct the same.

r_ehe proper rule was set out by this court in Burton
l's. S((lt Lak,' Ci(1;, G9 Utah 18G, 253 P 443, 51 ALR 364,
wht>rein thP court stated:
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"The statnte n•(1nire:s tl1at in <-«' 'P a claim i.'
deemed insufficient 01'
in <'ertain varticulars, the in:sufficien<'.V or d(•j\•ct lil.t:St lw lJOillted out by the cit_\·. rl1 he <'it,\· not lia-:ing dmw 11u,
it cannot now he ht>ard to :sa.'' that thv dairn
insufficient."
•)') ,.
al so B(Jwnwu cs. () !.Jl1en ( .''f
! y, .J.:>
L .t j 1 1<)("
. J, •lj'Jj>
·J
561. At no time or in an_\· rnamwr l1a8 the Boanl (I 1· County
Commissioners attempted to compl)· with thi:s affinnatiw
duty in the instant ca:se, but im;tead, both at the }waring
of the mobon in the District Court and on :suhs<•quent
appeal to this court, has repeatedly <l<'nied an)· obligation
to pay respondents.
S
k ee

POINT III. THE CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENTS IS NOT
BARRED BY STATUTE AS NOT BEING TIMELY FILED.

As discussed previously, respondt>nt:s' ldter dairn
was filed with the Board of County Couuni:ssionen; on
November 18, 1967, for :se1TiC('S pnfonned in ca:-;e Ko.

10905, which, contrary to the statement in
brief, page 11, is the prnper case nnmher for the amH'al
in State vs. Dixon. It is now, apparently, appellant's contentjon that the claim \\'a:s pn•rnatnn·, on the ground that
the last services had not been performed at tlw time the
claim was filed. HO\n-ver, a::; testified to by n·sp1111dent
at T. 4 and 5, the eriminal wo1·k pnforrned hy n·:-;1){)ndents is performed on a flat-fe<• ba:-;i:s. Com;eq11entl;..
under this concept, respond(•11h1' c-laim matured a1 tl1 1
time of acceptance of the appointH1vnt and, nrnl(·1·
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eoncept,
com pldely ade(1 nate to comply with the re<inireHwnts of 17-15-10UCA1953, as amended.
Further, in view of the County's participation in the
hearing hefon· the \Veber County District Court and,
suhse<1uently, before this Court, it is impossible to believe, as a practical matter, that the County was not compl<'tel.v informed of the nature and t)1)e of respondents'
claim and of their continuing assertion thereof. Respondents had informed vVebm· County that they would consider their appearance at the hearing on December 4,
19G7, as a rejection; and at no time did the Weber County
Board of Commissioners, through their attorney, indiC'ate any attitude except rejection of the claim in toto.
17-15-12 UCA 1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"Action on rejected claim-Limitation.-A
claimant dissatisfied with the rejection of his
claim or demand . . . may sue the county therefor at any time within one year after the first
rejection thereof by the board, but not afterward... "
Respondents filed tlwir complaint in the instant action on N ovPmber 27, 19GS, prior to the expiration of

one yPar from Dectm1ber 4, 1967.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and the well-established rule
of law in this jurisdiction that, upon appeal, the evidence
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must be viewed in a hght most fayorable to
the judgment of the trial court, and.
as ht•re, then
is substantial evidence to suport hi:s ckcisiun, the judgment should be affirmed and respon<lunts g-rantPd their
costs.
Respectfully submitted,

L. E. RICHARDSON
Attorn('y for Plaintiff and
Respondents.

